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SECTION 1983 CLAIM ACCRUAL UNDER WALLACE V.
KATO AND THE NEED FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING
*

Rebecca Garibotto

I.

INTRODUCTION
1

The oft-cited decision Heck v. Humphrey has led to years of misinterpretation and confusion regarding the time of accrual of certain
2
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. The Court decreed, in pertinent part, that
“in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been re3
versed on direct appeal,” or that it would otherwise be invalidated.
The Court further stated that such a claim would not otherwise be
cognizable under the statute, and that if the district court were to determine that “a judgment [on the § 1983 claim] in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” it must dismiss the case until the litigant can prove that the
4
conviction has been so invalidated. Although it was clear that the
Heck bar would apply to a § 1983 claim where a valid conviction was

*
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1
512 U.S. 477 (1994).
2
Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress
....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Section 1983 claims vindicate constitutional rights; for example, individuals can bring § 1983 actions for false arrest, malicious prosecution,
and selective enforcement.
3
Id. at 486–87.
4
Id. at 487.
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already in existence at the time of filing, the prevailing view among
the circuit courts was that the Heck bar would also apply to a § 1983
claim by a plaintiff whose criminal charges were still pending if success on the § 1983 claim would threaten the validity of a potential fu5
ture conviction in the underlying criminal action.
From this conclusion, it became a common perception among
the circuit courts that a § 1983 claim did not accrue until the § 1983
litigant received a favorable outcome in his underlying criminal trial
6
or in subsequent post-conviction proceedings. In Wallace v. Kato, the
7
Supreme Court intervened and clarified the meaning of Heck. Applying the traditional rule that a claim accrues when the litigant has a
8
“complete and present cause of action,” the Court stated that the
plaintiff, Andre Wallace, could have filed his § 1983 claim for false arrest and false imprisonment against his arresting officer as soon as
the allegedly wrongful arrest occurred, thereby indicating that such a
9
claim accrues at that time. After clarifying the issue of claim accrual,
the Court explained that the statute of limitations on a § 1983 claim
for false imprisonment begins to run when the arrestee is bound over
10
by a magistrate and held pursuant to legal process.

5

See Kucharski v. Leveille, 526 F. Supp. 2d 768, 774 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (“[M]ost
if not all circuits concluded that Heck [also] barred a section 1983 claim by a plaintiff
with criminal charges pending against him if success in the 1983 suit would be inconsistent with a future conviction.” (emphasis added)); see also Harvey v. Waldron, 210
F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000); Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 396, 398
(6th Cir. 1999); Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir. 1999);
Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999); Uboh v.
Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1006–07 (11th Cir. 1998); Washington v. Summerville, 127 F.3d
552, 556 (7th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996); Schilling v.
White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995).
6
See, e.g., Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety-Div. of
State Police, 411 F.3d 427, 447 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Under Heck, § 1983 claims for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence do not accrue until
the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.”).
7
549 U.S. 384 (2007).
8
Id. at 388 (citing Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v.
Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)).
9
The Court explained that “[e]very confinement of the person is an imprisonment.” Id. at 388 (quoting MARTIN L. NEWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS § 2, at 57 (Chicago, Callaghan and Company 1892) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “False arrest and
false imprisonment overlap; the former is a species of the latter.” Id. Therefore, the
Court refers to the two torts together as “false imprisonment.” Id. at 389.
10
Id. The Court explained that “the statute of limitations begins to run when the
alleged false imprisonment ends.” Id. at 389. “[T]hat is, the date petitioner became
held pursuant to legal process,” id. at 393, as “the sort of unlawful detention remediable by the tort of false imprisonment is detention without legal process,” id. 389.
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Overruling a decade’s worth of misinterpretations of Heck, the
Wallace Court characterized the notion that Heck could bar “an action
which would impugn an anticipated future conviction” as a “bizarre extension of Heck” and declared that courts should no longer embrace
11
such an interpretation. Although the Supreme Court did provide
some clarity through the Wallace decision, the lower courts continue
12
to grapple with its application. In effect, Wallace requires the immediate filing of § 1983 actions, exposing litigants to the possibility of
having to litigate their criminal and civil trials simultaneously. Although the employment of a federal rule of equitable tolling in such
circumstances would mitigate the harsh effects of the Wallace decision, the majority rejected the adoption of such a rule in this con13
text. Justice Breyer advocated in his dissenting opinion for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations on the § 1983 claim for the
duration of the state criminal proceedings, including the criminal
trial and the time during which the criminal defendant seeks an ap14
peal from a conviction or other post-conviction relief. The majority,
however, refused to recognize a federal rule of equitable tolling, noting that the Court typically relies on state law when determining
15
whether to toll a claim on a case-by-case basis.
Part II of this comment will briefly explain the interplay between
federal and state law with regard to § 1983 claims. Part III will explore the Heck decision and the lower courts’ interpretation of the
decision before the intervening Wallace decision. Part IV will provide
an in-depth explanation of the Wallace case. This section will discuss
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Wallace, as well as the majority’s
rejection of it. Further, Part IV will argue that the Court should have
adopted a federal rule of equitable tolling—as advocated for by Justice Breyer—so that the statute of limitations on § 1983 claims would
be tolled for the duration of the litigant’s underlying criminal trial, as
well as for the time during which post-conviction relief is sought.
This would prevent those with potentially meritorious § 1983 claims,
who have either received favorable outcomes in their criminal trials
or on appeal from their convictions, from being barred by the statute

11

Id. at 393.
See, e.g., Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2010); Cress v. City of
Ventnor, No. 08-1873, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22172 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2009); Telfair v.
Tandy, No. 08-731, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83462 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2008); Kucharski v.
Leveille, 526 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
13
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394.
14
Id. at 404 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
15
Id. at 394 (majority opinion).
12
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of limitations. Part V will explore the effects of the Wallace Court’s
requirement that a § 1983 litigant file the civil claim within such a
short period of time, including how the filing of the claim before institution of the criminal prosecution may effectively bind prosecutors’
hands to proceed with the criminal charge in an effort to protect the
police officers who have potentially violated the litigant’s constitutional rights. This section will also discuss the implications of forcing
the litigant to handle both causes of action—the underlying criminal
trial and the § 1983 civil claim—simultaneously. Finally, this section
will discuss Wallace’s “footnote four,” in which the Court identified,
but declined to provide a remedy for, a possible injustice that could
occur under the majority’s holding and thus produce a “result surely
16
not intended” by Heck.
Finally, Part VI will present a separate argument exploring the
inequities caused by this new interpretation of Heck against those
criminal defendants who have relied on prior interpretations of the
decision. This section will argue that, notwithstanding the earlierpresented argument that equitable tolling should be offered to a §
1983 litigant for the duration of his or her underlying criminal trial
and any appeal therefrom, courts should offer equitable tolling on
independent grounds due to reliance on pre-existing precedent and
the confusion caused by a new interpretation of the governing law.
II. SECTION 1983 AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
To state a cause of action under § 1983, the claimant must allege
(1) the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States and (2) that the alleged deprivation was caused by a
17
person acting under the color of state law. “Section 1983 does not
create substantive rights. It, instead, provides a federal cause of ac18
tion for the violation of a federal right.” State law determines when
a § 1983 claim accrues, provides the statute of limitations applicable
to the § 1983 claim, and also determines whether the limitations pe19
riod should be tolled, unless tolling is inconsistent with federal law.
In the context of § 1983 claims—and specifically those for false
imprisonment—the Wallace Court identified the most pertinent stat16

Id. at 395 n.4.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36
F.3d 1250, 1255–56 (3d Cir. 1994).
18
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Okla. City v.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985)).
19
Wilson v. Garcia, 417 U.S. 261, 269 (1985); Dique, 603 F.3d at 185 (citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387).
17
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ute of limitations to be that for personal-injury torts, the length of
20
which is typically two to three years, depending on the state. Federal
21
law governs the issue of what constitutes accrual. “Accrual is the occurrence of damages caused by a wrongful act—when a plaintiff has a
complete and present cause of action, that is, when the plaintiff can
22
file suit and obtain relief.” The Wallace Court, noting that claim accrual does not depend on whether the extent of injury is fully
23
known, found resolution of the underlying criminal trial to be unnecessary in determining the validity of the § 1983 claim of false im24
prisonment. Although Wallace’s claim of false imprisonment accrued immediately upon his arrest, the Court noted that the statute
of limitations for false imprisonment claims is delayed and does not
yet begin to run until the individual becomes held pursuant to legal
25
process.
III. PRE-WALLACE INTERPRETATIONS OF HECK V. HUMPHREY AND § 1983
CLAIM ACCRUAL
In Heck, the Court triggered years of confusion with one statement: “[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
26
conviction” has been invalidated. In Heck, the Court was faced with
a litigant who had already been convicted of voluntary manslaughter
27
in state court, and whose appeal of that conviction was still pending.
In his § 1983 complaint, Heck alleged, among other things, that the
investigation that led to his arrest was unlawful and that the police
28
had knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence. Finding that Heck’s
§ 1983 claim raised issues that disputed the legality of his conviction
29
and confinement, the district court dismissed the action. On ap20

Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389; see also Dique, 603 F.3d at 185 (“A section 1983 claim is
characterized as a personal-injury claim and thus is governed by the applicable state’s
statute of limitations for person-injury claims.”).
21
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388.
22
Dique, 603 F.3d at 185 (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
23
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391.
24
Id. at 397. The Court noted that only the tort of malicious prosecution, the
focus of the Heck decision, actually requires as an element of the offense the favorable termination of criminal proceedings. Id. at 392.
25
Id. at 389.
26
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994).
27
Id. at 478–89.
28
Id. at 479.
29
Id.
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peal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, as did the Supreme
30
Court. Heck stands for the principle that if a “judgment in favor of
the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his [existing]
conviction or sentence[,] . . . the complaint must be dismissed unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has al31
ready been invalidated.” At the heart of Heck was the fear that a
convicted criminal defendant would use the § 1983 civil action to at32
tack his existing conviction rather than exhaust his state remedies.
Although the Court intended that Heck would apply only to situations in which the § 1983 litigant had a valid criminal judgment in
existence at the time of filing, most circuit courts concluded that Heck
would also bar a § 1983 claim brought by a plaintiff with pending
criminal charges if a victory in the § 1983 suit would be inconsistent
33
with a potential conviction not yet rendered. The circuit courts collectively reached this conclusion even though the plaintiff in Heck
had already been convicted, and the Court did not contemplate or
address whether the possibility of a future conviction could also bar
34
such a claim. Thus began more than a decade’s worth of decisions
grounded in the belief that Heck “concluded that proof of the illegality of a conviction is a necessary element of the § 1983 cause of action”
and that “[u]nless that conviction has been reversed, there has been
no injury of constitutional proportions, and thus no § 1983 suit may
35
exist.” This notion persisted until the Supreme Court intervened to
clarify its holding in Heck with its decision in Wallace.
30

Id. at 479, 486.
Id. at 487.
32
See Kennedy v. City of Villa Hills, No. 07-122-DLB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17301,
at *5 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 6, 2008).
33
Kucharski v. Leveille, 526 F. Supp. 2d 768, 774 (E.D. Mich. 2007). “Many civil
right attorneys had [also] traditionally assumed that a civil rights claim for false arrest could not proceed unless the underlying criminal charges had been fully resolved in the claimant’s favor.” James B. Chanin, James B. Chanin on Wallace v. Kato,
Dec. 14, 2007, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, at 1–2, available at LEXIS, 2008
Emerging Issues 1501.
34
Heck, 512 U.S. at 478.
35
Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995); see also e.g., Harvey v.
Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Heck applies to pending criminal
charges, and that a claim, that if successful would necessarily imply the invalidity of a
conviction in a pending criminal prosecution, does not accrue so long as the potential for a conviction in the pending criminal prosecution continues to exist.”);
Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 396, 398 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he concerns
of Heck apply pre-conviction as well as post-conviction,” which means that “a prisoner
seeking to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure in a § 1983
claim must show that a decision in his favor would not imply the invalidity of his outstanding conviction . . . [and] that a decision in his favor would not imply the invalid31
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IV. ANALYZING WALLACE V. KATO
Wallace marked the Court’s first elucidation of the Heck bar; it
clarified that Heck was not intended to prevent a § 1983 claim by a
36
plaintiff who had not yet been criminally convicted. At the age of
fifteen, Andre Wallace was arrested on murder charges in the state of
37
Illinois in January 1994. After a lengthy interrogation, he agreed to
confess to the murder and thereafter signed an incriminating state38
ment prepared by and at the request of state attorneys. Before the
murder trial, Wallace unsuccessfully attempted to suppress his state39
ments, claiming that they were the product of an unlawful arrest. In
the ensuing trial, Wallace was convicted of the murder and sentenced
40
to twenty-six years in prison.
Wallace appealed the conviction, again contending that the in41
criminating statements were the fruit of an unlawful arrest. In December 1998, the Appellate Court of Illinois found that the officers
had violated Wallace’s Fourth Amendment rights, holding that they
42
had arrested him without probable cause. The court further found
that Wallace’s presence at the police station prior to his formal arrest—during which time the interrogation at issue occurred—
43
amounted to an involuntary, and thus illegal, seizure of his person.
ity of a future conviction.” (emphasis added)); Covington v. City of New York, 171
F.3d 117, 124 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[I]f success on [a § 1983] claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction in a pending criminal prosecution, such a claim does
not accrue so long as the potential for a judgment in the pending criminal prosecution
continues to exist.” (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d
Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Beck v. City of Muskogee Police
Dep’t, 195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Heck precludes § 1983 claims relating to
pending charges when a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply
the invalidity of any conviction or sentence that might result from prosecution of the
pending charges. Such claims arise at the time the charges are dismissed.” (emphasis
added)); Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1006–07 (11th Cir. 1998); Washington v.
Summerville, 127 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 1997) (“If success on these claims would
have necessarily implied the invalidity of a potential conviction on the murder
charge, then Washington’s claims did not accrue until the day on which the murder
charge was dismissed . . . .”); Smith, 87 F.3d at 113 (“In terms of the conflicts which
Heck sought to avoid, there is no difference between a conviction which is outstanding
at the time the civil rights action is instituted and a potential conviction on a pending
charge that may be entered at some point thereafter.”).
36
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007).
37
Id. at 386.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
People v. Wallace, 701 N.E.2d 87, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
42
Id. at 94.
43
Id.
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This decision came nearly five years after Wallace’s arrest. Following
another round of appeals and nearly three more years, the appellate
court found, in August 2001, that the illegal seizure rendered Wallace’s statements inadmissible in the criminal trial and therefore re45
manded the case for a new trial. Unwilling to proceed to trial without the incriminating statements as evidence, the prosecutors
46
decided to drop the murder charges against Wallace in April 2002.
Within one year of the prosecution dropping the charges, Wallace instituted a § 1983 action against the City of Chicago and several
47
of its officers, seeking damages resulting from his unlawful arrest.
Wallace brought the action in April 2003, nine years after the occurrence of the underlying events—the murder and his subsequent ar48
rest. Although Wallace filed his § 1983 claim within one year of the
state criminal proceedings terminating in his favor, the district court
found that his claim was time-barred because the applicable two-year
49
statute of limitations for personal-injury torts had expired. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the district court
that Wallace’s claim accrued at the time of his arrest, not when his
50
conviction was later invalidated.
A. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, seizing the opportunity
to clear up the confusion over § 1983 claim accrual that resulted from
51
Heck. The Court noted that the Seventh Circuit’s approach and the
52
Heck approach would produce very different results. On the one
hand, “if the statute on [Wallace’s] cause of action began to run at
the time of his unlawful arrest, or even at the time he was ordered
53
held by a magistrate, his § 1983 suit was plainly dilatory.” On the
44

See id. at 87.
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387.
52
Id. at 387–88.
53
Id. at 387. The statute of limitations was tolled in this case, but only for the
amount of time that it took for Wallace to reach the age of majority: “two-plus years.”
Id. at 388. The Court ultimately concluded that Wallace’s false imprisonment ended
at the time “when legal process was initiated against him, and the statute would have
begun to run from that date, but for its tolling by reason of [his] minority.” Id. at
390.
45
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other hand, if “the commencement date for running of the statute
[wa]s governed by . . . Heck v. Humphrey, that date may [have been]
the date on which [Wallace’s] conviction was vacated, in which case
54
the § 1983 suit would have been timely filed.” Recognizing this
great disparity, the Court sought to elucidate the true meaning of
Heck and adjudge Wallace’s case in accordance with it.
The Court opened its opinion by distinguishing between claim
accrual and the commencement of the running of the statute of limi55
tations. In holding that a § 1983 claim for false imprisonment accrues at the time of arrest, it reiterated the well-established principle
that a claim accrues when the litigant has a “complete and present
56
cause of action.” The Court then asserted that Wallace was entitled
to, and thus could have, filed his § 1983 claim as soon as the wrongful
57
arrest occurred. Accordingly, the Court noted, the statute of limita58
tions would typically begin to run at the time of accrual. The Court
acknowledged, however, that impracticalities may prevent a victim
59
still imprisoned as a result of the unlawful arrest from bringing suit.
The commencement of the statute of limitations on a false imprisonment claim is thus somewhat delayed so as to compensate for this
impediment until the victim becomes held pursuant to legal process—“when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or ar60
raigned on charges.” The Court, however, made it clear that this
did not mean that Wallace could not have filed his § 1983 claim immediately upon his arrest, for although the statute of limitations had
not begun to run at that time, Wallace had still been sufficiently in61
jured by the arrest itself to bring suit. Ultimately, the Wallace Court
refused to embrace the argument that the statute of limitations on a
false arrest claim begins to run only after a possible future conviction
62
occurs and is invalidated. The Court also rejected the notion that

54

Id. at 388.
Id. at 388–89.
56
Id. at 388 (quoting Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v.
Ferbar Corp., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388. The Court noted that Wallace had been held without
legal process; the officers did not have a warrant for his arrest, nor did they have
probable cause to justify his detention. Id. at 389.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 389.
61
Id. at 390 n.3.
62
Id. at 392.
55
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the statute of limitations on the claim should be tolled until this hy63
pothetical future conviction is set aside.
Recognizing the pervasive misperception among the circuit
courts regarding § 1983 claim accrual, the Wallace Court noted what
had especially complicated the issue of accrual in Heck and most likely led to such confusion; the Heck Court had “analogized [Heck’s]
suit to one for malicious prosecution, an element of which is the fa64
vorable termination of criminal proceedings.” Although a criminal
defendant cannot file a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution until the
underlying criminal proceedings have terminated in his favor, favorable termination is not an essential element of all personal-injury
torts for which § 1983 can be invoked. After the Court asserted that
false imprisonment ends once the victim is held pursuant to legal
process, it sought to elucidate the distinction between malicious
65
prosecution and false imprisonment. The Court noted that once
the arrestee becomes detained pursuant to legal process, any unlawful detention thereafter
forms part of the damages for the entirely distinct tort of malicious prosecution, which remedies detention accompanied, not
by absence of legal process, but by wrongful institution of legal process. If there is a false arrest claim, damages for that claim cover
the time of detention up until issuance of process or arraignment,
but not more. From that point on, any damages recoverable must
66
be based on a malicious prosecution claim . . . .

The Court accordingly rejected Wallace’s argument that his false imprisonment did not end until he was released from custody when the
67
state dropped the charges against him. To obtain damages resulting
from his detention spanning the time of his arraignment through his
release from custody, Wallace would have had to bring an action for
malicious prosecution. As noted earlier, favorable termination is an
68
essential element of a malicious prosecution claim; thus, his claim
for injuries incurred during that period of detention would not have
accrued until the state dropped the charges against him. Theoreti63

Wallace, 549 U.S. at 392–93.
Id. at 392; see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994) (“[T]he hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of
outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily
require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement, just
as it has always applied to actions for malicious prosecution.”).
65
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389–90.
66
Id. at 390 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
67
Id.
68
See supra text accompanying note 64.
64
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cally speaking, if Wallace had brought a § 1983 claim for malicious
prosecution in addition to his claim for false imprisonment, his claim
of malicious prosecution, whether meritorious or not, would have
been timely filed; he instituted his § 1983 action within one year of
the criminal proceedings terminating in his favor, which occurred
when the prosecution dropped the charges against him in April
69
2002. Because the governing statute of limitations in this case was
two years, Wallace would have had until April 2004 to bring such an
70
action.
Prior to the Wallace Court’s clear distinction between these two
torts, lower courts mistakenly extended the malicious prosecution
standard to other § 1983 claims—such as false arrest, false imprisonment, and selective enforcement—holding favorable termination to
be a requirement of Heck, and construing Heck as barring a § 1983
claim, which, if resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, would effectively im71
pugn the validity of an anticipated future conviction. Notwithstanding this pervasive interpretation of Heck, the Wallace Court quickly
dismissed its validity and characterized such extensions of Heck as “bi72
zarre:”
In an action for false arrest it would require the plaintiff . . . to
speculate about whether a prosecution will be brought, whether it
will result in conviction, and whether the pending civil action will
impugn that verdict . . . . And what if the plaintiff . . . guesses
wrong, and the anticipated future conviction never occurs, because of acquittal or dismissal? Does that event . . . trigger accrual
of the cause of action? Or what if prosecution never occurs—
what will the trigger be then? We are not disposed to embrace
73
this bizarre extension of Heck.

Instead, the Court reinforced that Heck’s rule of deferred accrual applies only when an outstanding criminal judgment exists at the time
74
of filing. It further noted that, even if Heck were to apply to the date
on which the statute of limitations began to run rather than to the
date of accrual, at neither point in time was a criminal conviction in
existence that Wallace’s § 1983 action could potentially have im-

69
70
71
72
73
74

Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387.
Id.
See cases cited supra note 35; supra text accompanying notes 33–35.
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393.
Id.
Id.
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75

pugned. Therefore, nothing about Heck should have barred Wallace’s § 1983 suit at that time, or prevented him from filing it.
Through Wallace, the Court clarified years of misinterpretations
of its prior decision and affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling that
Wallace’s § 1983 claim was barred by the statute of limitations because his unlawful-arrest claim accrued at the time that he was arrested. Wallace did not need to wait until the state obtained a conviction
against him—which at the time of his arrest was only a possibility—
and then again until that conviction was later set aside for his claim to
76
accrue.
Although the impracticalities that the majority claimed would
result from preventing a delayed § 1983 accrual are not without mer77
it, these concerns do not justify the Court’s refusal to implement
equitable tolling on a § 1983 claim once a criminal proceeding is instituted against a § 1983 litigant. The Court did propose one potential remedy, suggesting that it would be within the district court’s discretion to stay the § 1983 civil action in such a situation, pending the
78
outcome of the state criminal proceedings. The only situation in
which Heck would require dismissal of the § 1983 claim would be
when the plaintiff is convicted and the stayed civil action would ques79
tion the validity of that conviction. This procedural “safeguard,”
however, falls short of fully protecting the § 1983 plaintiff from having to litigate his civil claim and defend against his criminal charge
simultaneously, as this power to stay is merely discretionary and may
not always be effectuated. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissenting
opinion, “In the absence of a stay, a litigant . . . would have . . . to divide his attention between criminal and civil cases with attendant risks
80
of loss of time and energy as well as of inconsistent findings.” Having to divide his attention between the two cases would also impede
the litigant’s ability to defend himself in the best possible way in his
criminal trial, the magnitude of which is exemplified by Wallace itself;
Wallace was in custody and facing a twenty-six-year prison sentence
throughout the duration of the state criminal proceedings, but, at the

75

Id.
Id. at 390.
77
Id. at 393.
78
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393–94 (“If a plaintiff files a false-arrest claim before he has
been convicted . . . it is within the power of the district court . . . to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.”).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76
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same time, the majority expected him to have also been litigating his
81
§ 1983 claim.
B. Justice Breyer’s Dissent and the Court’s Refusal to Adopt Equitable
Tolling
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer characterized the majority’s rule as one “that would require immediate filing, followed by an
82
uncertain system of stays, dismissals, and possible refiling.” He instead argued that the implementation of equitable tolling in such §
83
1983 suits would offer a preferable result. Courts have applied equitable tolling “[w]here a plaintiff because of disability, irremediable
lack of information, or other circumstances beyond his control just
84
cannot reasonably be expected to sue in time.” Justice Breyer thus
advocated for the statute of limitations on the § 1983 claim to be equitably tolled for the duration of the criminal trial, and even for the
85
time during which the litigant challenges his conviction on appeal.
The majority, however, was unmoved by the argument and refused to
86
adopt a federal tolling rule to that effect.
Justice Breyer argued that equitable tolling should apply “where
a § 1983 plaintiff reasonably claims that the unlawful behavior of
which he complains was, or will be, necessary to a criminal convic87
tion.” Once that is established, the limitations period could be equitably tolled (1) from the time charges are brought until dismissal, ac88
quittal, or conviction and (2) during the appeals process. It is clear
that Justice Breyer’s proposed tolling rule would ensure a tight nexus
between the § 1983 claim and the underlying criminal action. Of
course, despite this tight nexus, courts will, at times, toll § 1983 claims
89
even though the claims would not be barred under Heck. While this
approach is over-inclusive, this would be but a negligible consequence of adequately protecting the target class of § 1983 litigants
whose claims would be barred by Heck. Further, the cost of overinclusiveness is outweighed by the benefit that equitable tolling
81

Id. at 386 (majority opinion).
Id. at 400 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83
Id.
84
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 400 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller v. Runyon, 77
F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
85
Id. at 401.
86
Id. at 394 (majority opinion).
87
Id. at 401 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
88
Id.
89
Id.
82
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would prevent the possible § 1983 plaintiff, defendant, and even the
federal court, from having to “speculate as to whether the claims are
in any way barred until the state court has had the opportunity to
90
consider the claims in the criminal context.” This would also reduce the risk of inconsistent legal determinations. A state court
could acquit the defendant, or overturn his conviction on appeal, after finding a constitutional violation that negates the validity of the
charge or conviction, while the federal court, trying the § 1983 claim
simultaneously, could find there to be no constitutional violation—or
91
vice versa.
Breyer further opined that if tolling were employed, plaintiffs
would very rarely, if ever, choose to file a § 1983 claim while the criminal case is still pending or on-going in order to devote due diligence
92
and attention to the criminal trial. Even if they did choose to file at
this time, Justice Breyer noted, the district court could, in those rare
cases, stay the action if it chose or dismiss the claim without prejudice
without fear that the statute of limitations would run by the conclusion of the criminal proceedings and leave the plaintiff without a
93
remedy. Perhaps the most important rationale behind the employment of equitable tolling under these circumstances is that it will
“above all, assure a plaintiff who possesses a meritorious § 1983 claim
that his pursuit of criminal remedies designed to free him from unlawful confinement will not compromise his later ability to obtain civ94
il § 1983 redress as well.” A harmed individual should not have to
forgo the opportunity to pursue a claim of damages for a constitutional violation in order to rightfully devote full attention and resources to a criminal action in which he is fighting for freedom. A
criminal defendant’s interest in freedom from unlawful confinement
is necessarily paramount, and the import of this interest should not
be diminished through the forced juggling of another proceeding.
Nor should it preclude him from seeking other forms of relief for the
suffered constitutional violation beyond release from unlawful custody. He should have the opportunity to litigate both actions fully and
completely and should not have to choose one over the other or juggle both proceedings simultaneously, which would necessarily cause
him to devote less time and attention to each proceeding.

90
91
92
93
94

Wallace, 549 U.S. at 403.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id. at 403.

GARIBOTTO_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/24/2012 3:41 PM

COMMENT

1275

The majority did recognize the difficulty a litigant would face in
having to divide attention between the criminal and civil actions as a
rationale for the employment of equitable tolling, though it identi95
fied this concern as the “only rationale for such a rule.” Despite the
validity of the litigant’s interest in primarily dedicating and focusing
energy on the criminal proceedings, the Court commented that equitable tolling was not an appropriate tool to avoid the possibility of
96
concurrent litigation.
It merely retorted, rather insensitively,
“[W]hen has it been the law that a criminal defendant, or a potential
criminal defendant, is absolved from all other responsibilities that the
97
law would otherwise place upon him?” Equitable tolling, however,
would not absolve the defendant of his legal responsibilities; rather, it
would give a defendant who has a meritorious constitutional claim
and who does not deserve of a criminal conviction an adequate opportunity to vindicate his claim and obtain relief from the injury he
suffered at the hands of state officials.
In rejecting Justice Breyer’s argument for equitable tolling, the
Court relied on the fact that it generally refers to state law for the applicable tolling rules and thus declined to deviate from the norm and
98
develop a federal tolling rule. The disparity among the states’ tolling laws, however, warrants the implementation of a federal tolling
statute because it is impractical to force a (potential) criminal defendant to file his civil § 1983 claim immediately and then manage
99
both proceedings simultaneously.
As discussed below, an additional reason for the majority’s rejection of Justice Breyer’s equitable tolling argument was the concern
that equitable tolling would encourage the filing of meritless § 1983
claims by manipulative crafters of “conviction-impugning cause[s] of
100
action.” In reality, however, the majority’s refusal to adopt equitable tolling “means that large numbers of defendants will be sued im-

95

Id. at 396 (majority opinion).
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 396.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 394 (explaining that no Illinois cases had “provid[ed] tolling in even remotely comparable circumstances”).
99
Although Justice Breyer recognized that “§ 1983 ordinarily borrows its limitations principles from state law,” he argued that “[i]f a given state court lacks the necessary tolling provision, . . . § 1983 . . . [should] permit[] the federal courts to devise
and impose such principles.” Id. at 402 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Indeed, “[g]aps in
federal civil rights acts should be filled by state law, as long as that law is not inconsistent with the federal law” and its “goals of uniformity and federalism.” Id. (citing
Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 538–40 (1989)).
100
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 395 (majority opinion).
96
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mediately by all potential § 1983 plaintiffs with arguable Heck issues,
101
no matter how meritless the claims.”
These plaintiffs’ sole motivation is the desire to preserve a potential § 1983 claim in case it becomes apparent during the state criminal proceedings that they were
victims of a constitutional violation, rather than a sincere belief that
they have suffered such a violation. Equitable tolling, however, would
prevent the courts from being bombarded by these potentially unnecessary “protective filings,” as these criminal defendants—and potential § 1983 litigants—could rest assured, “secure in the knowledge
that the suit,” if eventually worth pursuing, “could be timely filed at a
102
later date.”
Admittedly, a federal equitable tolling rule in this context would
be most effective and practical if it were applied retrospectively. Otherwise, “it would not be known whether tolling is appropriate by reason of the Heck bar until it is established that the newly entered conviction would be impugned by the not-yet-filed, and thus utterly
103
indeterminate, § 1983 claim.” The majority, however, rejected the
possibility of determining whether to employ tolling retrospectively,
offering only the argument that defendants must be alerted in advance of the need to preserve evidence and other relevant materials
beyond the normal limitations period in the event that tolling were to
104
prolong the viability of the claim. The Court observed that the retrospective extension of the limitations period by a plaintiff who has
“craft[ed] a conviction-impugning cause of action” would frustrate
105
this need. Unfortunately, the majority took into consideration only
the plaintiff who has designed or “crafted” a case to trigger the Heck
bar and thus trigger this hypothetical federal tolling rule. What the
Court seemingly failed to consider is the plaintiff with a potentially
meritorious § 1983 claim who did not need to “craft[] a convictionimpugning cause of action” but instead had one due to the officers
who violated his constitutional rights. The Court failed to consider
the plaintiff who had received a favorable disposition in his criminal
trial or won the appeal from his conviction because the state determined that he was the victim of a constitutional violation. The Court
failed to consider the plaintiff who did not file his civil claim within
the limitations period because he was acting in reliance on prior interpretations of Heck and was thus under the common misconception
101
102
103
104
105

Id. at 404 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 403, 404 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id. at 394–95 (majority opinion).
Id. at 395.
Id.
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that his claim would not accrue until the criminal proceedings had
terminated in his favor. The Court failed to consider the plaintiff
who did not timely file his civil claim because he was understandably
and rightfully consumed with defending himself throughout the duration of the underlying criminal action.
V. THE EFFECTS OF THE WALLACE DECISION
The Wallace decision has placed criminal defendants who have
potentially meritorious § 1983 claims at a disadvantage. Wallace’s requirement that criminal defendants file their § 1983 claims within a
very short limitations period makes it difficult for such litigants to
vindicate their rights. The applicable limitations period is likely to be
much shorter than the amount of time it typically takes to fully litigate criminal charges in state court and thereafter seek postconviction relief from the state if necessary. The terrible consequences of the Wallace decision would have been eliminated had the
Court accepted Justice Breyer’s proposal of a federal rule of equitable
tolling. Should a criminal defense attorney now be obligated to inform his clients that they might have civil claims that they need to file
right away?
Further, the limitations period should certainly be tolled for the
time when the Heck bar is triggered to the time when the criminal defendant subsequently finds success on appeal from his conviction or
through post-conviction relief. Such tolling is especially necessary in
light of the inequities that would result from the type of situations
106
contemplated in the fourth footnote of the majority opinion. Failure to toll contravenes the intent behind the Heck decision, and even
the intent of the Wallace majority.
A. Wallace’s Effect—Forcing Immediate Filing of § 1983 Claims
Wallace essentially requires a § 1983 litigant to file his civil claim
immediately and perhaps even before institution of the criminal prosecution against him. To use the language of Wallace, there are “bizarre” results from forcing a person who might be prosecuted to initi107
ate litigation within the two-year period of limitations. Specifically,
this process effectively binds prosecutors’ hands to proceed with the
criminal charge in an effort to protect the police officers who have
potentially violated the litigant’s constitutional rights. Another possi-

106

For a discussion of the circumstances contemplated in footnote four of the
Wallace majority opinion, see infra Part V.B.
107
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393.
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bility is that it may even encourage prosecutors to punish the litigant
for his audacity, as one of the dangers of forcing the litigant to file his
§ 1983 claim immediately is that “[p]rosecutors and police could
press for more severe sentences for those who dare to sue the po108
109
lice.”
This, too, would be a “result surely not intended” by the
Wallace Court.
Further, even if the § 1983 litigant does not file his civil claim before institution of the underlying criminal proceedings, the short
statute of limitations period, coupled with the reality that criminal ac110
tions consume a significant amount of time necessarily means that,
under Wallace, “[c]lients with pending criminal charges [will] be
forced to pursue civil actions at the same time [that] their criminal
111
Some dangers likely to result from such a
charges are pending.”
system include plea bargains contingent on the defendant surrendering his civil claim, as well as forced waiver of the defendant’s Fifth
112
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. An individual who
has suffered a constitutional violation should not have to choose between available remedies when he is entitled to both. Nor should he
have to divide attention and resources between two proceedings, especially where his freedom is at stake in one of those proceedings.
As mentioned, the Wallace Court suggested a possible remedy to
this problem, stating that when the plaintiff timely files his § 1983
claim, it would be within the district court’s discretion to stay the ac113
tion pending the outcome of the underlying criminal proceeding.
The Court, however, did not mandate that district courts stay the action in such circumstances and did not suggest that the power to stay
114
the action is anything more than discretionary. In fact, lower courts
have relied on this language in denying motions to stay a § 1983
115
claim pending the outcome of a criminal action.
Although some courts have relied on this language from the
116
Wallace opinion to grant motions to stay a civil action, it remains
108

Chanin, supra note 33, at 2.
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 395 n.4.
110
In Wallace, the state criminal proceedings spanned more than eight years.
111
Chanin, supra note 33, at 2.
112
Id.
113
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394–95.
114
Id.
115
See, e.g., Cress v. City of Ventnor, No. 08-1873, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22172, at
*12–13 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2009) (rejecting the argument that Wallace requires courts to
enter a stay and holding that this decision is within the courts’ discretion).
116
See, e.g., Telfair v. Tandy, No. 08-731, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83462, at *18
(D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2008) (granting a motion to stay the § 1983 action alleging false ar109
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problematic that the decision to stay is discretionary rather than
mandatory. If the district courts decide not to exercise their power of
abstention and stay the civil action pending resolution of the underlying criminal proceeding, a possibility of inconsistent judgments from
117
the state and federal courts arises. It is very likely that a defendant
could be convicted in the underlying state criminal trial and yet be
successful in federal court on his § 1983 claim upon a finding of a
constitutional violation that, if found by the state court, would have
prevented conviction. Such a result is nonsensical. It is better to allow the state courts to first deal with and dispose of the criminal action before the federal court entertains the § 1983 claim. As Justice
Breyer pointed out in his dissent in Wallace, if the district court refuses to stay the §1983 action, the litigant will be forced to divide his attention between the two cases, compromising his efficacy and chanc118
es of success in both actions, and risking inconsistent findings. It is
further problematic that even when courts do opt to stay the civil action, “the stay may extend for years while post-conviction relief is
sought” if the litigant is convicted on the underlying charges, which
presents a less than ideal situation considering “the potential to clog
119
the court[s’] docket[s] with unresolvable cases.”
The more efficient approach is to mandate equitable tolling of a litigant’s § 1983
claim from the time when criminal charges are filed through acquittal or reversal of the conviction on appeal.
B. Wallace’s Footnote Four and the “Result Surely Not Intended”
In Wallace, the Court acknowledged that § 1983 actions sometimes accrue before the related criminal conviction—that is, before
120
the Heck bar is triggered.
This, the Court noted, “raises the question whether, assuming that the Heck bar takes effect when the later
conviction is obtained, the statute of limitations on the once valid
121
cause of action is tolled as long as the Heck bar subsists.” Using the
case before it as an example, the Court noted that if Wallace’s conviction had “caused the statute of limitations on his (possibly) impugning but yet-to-be-filed cause of action to be tolled until the conviction
rest in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the criminal proceedings were
ongoing).
117
See Whitley v. Allegheny Cnty., No. 07-403, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21262, at *75
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010) (citing DiNicola v. DiPaolo, 945 F. Supp. 848, 860–61 (W.D.
Pa. 1996)).
118
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 400 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
119
Telfair, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83462, at *22, *23.
120
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394.
121
Id.
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was set aside, his filing . . . would have been timely.” Recognizing
that state law provides the tolling rules, the Court first looked to see if
123
Illinois had provided tolling in comparable circumstances.
The
124
search, however, proved unfruitful.
The Court then rejected the
125
adoption of a federal tolling rule.
In footnote four of the decision, the Court commented that if a
§ 1983 plaintiff were to file suit upon his arrest and his suit were subsequently dismissed under Heck upon his conviction in the underlying
criminal action, “the statute of limitations, absent tolling, would have
run by the time he obtain[s] reversal of his conviction. If under
those circumstances he were not allowed to refile his suit, Heck would
126
produce immunity from § 1983 liability, a result surely not intended.”
Although the Court acknowledged that the statute of limitations
should not run during this time period, it declined to address how
such a situation should be handled. The Court was able to avoid this
result since Wallace, the petitioner before the Court, had not timely
filed his § 1983 claim. It was therefore unnecessary for the Court to
decide the amount of time Wallace would have had to refile his §
1983 suit once the Heck bar was removed when his conviction was re127
versed.
Despite the Court’s unwillingness to develop a federal tolling
rule to take effect when there are criminal and civil proceedings taking place simultaneously that arise out of the same incident and involve the same parties, the statute of limitations should definitely be
tolled for the time in which the Heck bar would take effect, regardless
of whether the criminal defendant has yet filed his § 1983 claim. This
means that the statute of limitations should be tolled in circumstances like those contemplated in footnote four—from the time that a §
1983 litigant who filed his claim upon arrest is convicted in his underlying criminal trial through the time during which the litigant appeals
his conviction. The statute of limitations should also be tolled in a
case like Wallace in which the criminal defendant has not yet filed his
§ 1983 claim, but tolling from the time of conviction through appeal
would prevent the statute of limitations from expiring. In either scenario, equitable tolling for the duration of this time period would
protect those with potentially meritorious § 1983 claims who found
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 395 n.4 (emphasis added).
Id.
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success on appeal from their convictions from being barred by the
128
statute of limitations.
VI. ARGUING FOR EQUITABLE TOLLING DUE TO RELIANCE ON PREEXISTING PRECEDENT
Although the method for dealing with § 1983 claim accrual as
announced by the Wallace Court was inconsistent with the thenpredominately accepted practice of the circuit courts, the majority refused to adopt a federal rule of equitable tolling to alleviate the tran129
Perhaps most problematic about the Wallace decision is its
sition.
retroactive application—that is, its application to § 1983 claims arising out of events that occurred before the Court decided the inter130
vening Wallace decision.
Inequities result when a new legal rule is
strictly applied against a plaintiff who understandably relied on prior
interpretations of the law and acted in accordance with it. Courts
should employ equitable tolling in its own right on the grounds that a
litigant’s reliance on pre-existing precedent, or misinterpretation of
the law created by courts’ confusion, should not prejudice a litigant
with a potentially meritorious claim whose failure to comply with the
law and file within the statute of limitations is not due to a lack of diligence on his part.
Recently, in Dique v. New Jersey State Police, the Third Circuit relied on Wallace in overruling its previous incorrect interpretations of
131
Heck. In that case, Dique had been arrested for possession of drugs
in January 1990 and was ultimately convicted on such drug-related

128

For an example of how a lower court has dealt with Wallace’s footnote four, see
Kucharski v. Leveille, 526 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Mich. 2007). The court relied on
the footnote’s language in applying equitable tolling due to the plaintiff’s reasonable
reliance on the circuit’s precedential interpretations of Heck that were ultimately
overruled by Wallace. Id. at 775. The court found that the plaintiff reasonably believed that his § 1983 cause of action for illegal seizure did not accrue until his conviction was overturned because of preexisting precedent in the circuit. Id. The court
thus held that equitable tolling should be applied to avoid a virtual § 1983 immunity—a “result surely not intended” by Wallace. Id. (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 395
n.4).
129
Kucharski, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 770.
130
See Hargroves v. City of New York, 694 F. Supp. 2d 198, 211 n.10 (E.D.N.Y.
2010) (noting that Wallace applies retroactively); Mallard v. Potenza, No. 94-CV-223,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86336, at *10–11 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2007) (holding that Wallace should be applied retroactively); cf. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S.
749, 752 (1995) (holding that when the Court applies a new legal rule to the parties
before it, other courts must apply the rule retroactively).
131
603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).
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132

charges in June 1999. In April of 2002, twelve years after his arrest
and three years after his conviction, the court vacated Dique’s conviction because “colorable issues of racial profiling existed at the time of
133
the arrest,” and he was released from prison.
Thereafter, Dique
134
filed § 1983 claims for false arrest and selective-enforcement.
Initially, the district court dismissed Dique’s claim, finding it to be time135
barred. Dique successfully appealed, however, in light of the Third
Circuit’s 2005 decision of Gibson v. Superintendent of New Jersey Department of Law & Public Safety, which had interpreted Heck to mean that a
§ 1983 claim does not accrue until a potential future conviction is re136
versed, expunged, or invalidated.
The Third Circuit therefore remanded the case and the district court ruled that Dique’s claims sur137
During discovery on remand, the Supreme Court decided
vived.
Wallace and the district court granted the officers’ motions for summary judgment, ruling that Dique’s claims were time-barred under
138
The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the Supreme
Wallace.
Court’s intervening decision required overruling of the court’s previ139
ous opinion.
Dique illuminates the inequities that result when Wallace is applied against a litigant who relied upon prior interpretations of Heck
in refraining from filing his § 1983 claim until the criminal action
terminated in his favor. The Third Circuit did not employ equitable
tolling to preserve Dique’s claim even though he relied on Gibson and
140
Accordingly, Dique,
other pre-Wallace interpretations of Heck.
whose convictions had already been overturned at the state-level due
to the finding of a constitutional violation, was left without a remedy
141
for such intrusion upon his rights.
132

Id. at 183. The nine-year gap occurred because he became a fugitive. Id. at
183 n.3.
133
Id. at 184 (internal quotation marks omitted).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. (citing Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 411
F.3d 427 (3d Cir. 2005)).
137
Dique, 603 F.3d at 184.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 188. “[A]n intervening Supreme Court decision is a sufficient basis for
. . . overrul[ing] a prior panel’s opinion.” Id. at 187.
140
Id.
141
The statute of limitations was equitably tolled for some time in this case,
though it was not due to the defendant’s reliance on pre-existing precedent. Instead, the statute was tolled under the discovery rule, under which “the accrual of the
claim [is] postponed until the injured party discovers, or by exercise of reasonable
diligence and intelligence should have discovered, that he may have a basis for an
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Kucharski v. Leveille presents another example of a criminal case
142
that was ongoing at the time of the Wallace decision.
In March of
2001, William Kucharski, Sr. and William Kucharski, Jr. were both ar143
rested in connection with a motor vehicle accident. Both were convicted in state-court proceedings, but the appellate court ultimately
reversed some of these convictions in 2004 after finding Fourth
144
Amendment violations.
The convictions were reversed in Septem145
ber of 2004. Within a year, Kucharski Sr. and Kucharski Jr. filed a §
146
1983 claim for the illegal seizure. Initially, the district court rejected the officers’ argument that the § 1983 claim, which was filed more
than four years after the seizure in question, was barred by the statute
147
of limitations.
Shortly after this ruling, the court instructed both parties to file
briefs commenting on Wallace’s effect on the statute of limitations is148
sues in the case at hand.
After reviewing the briefs, the court
granted summary judgment in the officers’ favor, finding that under
Wallace the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limita149
Looking to the Supreme Court for guidance, the district
tions.
court noted that “although the practice announced by the Supreme
Court was somewhat at odds with the general understanding of Heck,
the Court did not allow equitable tolling”; therefore the district court
150
declined to apply the doctrine as well.
In a motion for reconsideration, the Kucharskis argued for the
employment of equitable tolling due to reliance on pre-Wallace prec151
They waited to file the § 1983 claim until the state court
edent.
convictions were overturned, believing that their § 1983 claim did not

actionable claim.” Id. at 185. This was applied to Dique’s selective enforcement
claim because it was not until 2001 that defense counsel became aware of 90,000
pages of documents that revealed a state-wide practice of selective enforcement
based on race. Id. at 184. Despite this tolling, however, Dique still filed his § 1983
claim more than two years after this discovery. Id.
142
526 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
143
Id. at 769. Kucharski, Jr. was arrested and taken to have his blood tested for
alcohol; Kucharski Sr. was arrested for attempting to interfere with the arrest of his
son. Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Plaintiffs filed suit on September 26, 2005. Id.
147
Kucharski, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 769.
148
Id. at 770.
149
Id.
150
Kucharski v. Leveille, 478 F. Supp. 2d 928, 931 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
151
Id.
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152

accrue until then.
The presiding court noted that this belief was
strongly supported by a long line of Sixth Circuit precedent, but that
since “the Wallace Court did not allow equitable tolling to save the
plaintiff’s claim in that case, [it] did not consider the possibility in
153
the present matter.” This is the exact danger that Wallace’s failure
to mandate equitable tolling presents. Although state law may provide the remedy of equitable tolling to the plaintiff—as Michigan law
ultimately did in Kucharski—the presiding court may fail to consider
the remedy of equitable tolling since the Supreme Court did not
mandate that such relief be granted.
Despite the Kucharski court’s initial failure to entertain then notion of equitable tolling, it conducted an extensive tolling analysis in
154
deciding the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.
As limitations
periods and tolling rules are to be determined by the governing
state’s law, the court referred to Michigan law and found that the
state’s Supreme Court allowed tolling “when the plaintiff’s failure to
comply with the statute [of limitations] is a result of the confusing
155
state of the law.”
Thus, where the “[p]laintiff’s failure to comply
with the applicable statute of limitations is the product of an understandable confusion about the legal nature of her claim, rather than
a negligent failure to preserve her rights,” the doctrine of equitable
156
tolling applies.
The Michigan Supreme Court was clear, however,
that the use of such an equitable doctrine was limited to cases in
157
which the courts themselves were responsible for the confusion.
The Kucharski court recognized that a great inequity would result
if it were to strictly apply Wallace to the case before it:
If the plaintiffs had filed their case immediately after the search
on May 4, 2001, Sixth Circuit precedent would have required
dismissal of the case as barred by Heck. Once the law changed,
the plaintiffs’ convictions having been reversed on September 30,
2004, the plaintiffs would be barred by the statute of limitations
158
under Wallace. This is “a result surely not intended.”

The court was convinced that the plaintiffs had relied on Sixth Circuit precedent to their detriment and attributed the untimeliness of
152

Id.
Kucharski, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 771.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 772 (citing Bryant v. Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr., 684 N.W.2d 864, 876
(Mich. 2004); Ward v. Siano, 730 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006)).
157
Id.
158
Id. at 775 (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 395 n.4 (2007)).
153
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the plaintiffs’ complaint to “an understandable confusion about the
state of the law as to when their claim accrued,” not to any failure on
159
their part to diligently pursue their claims. Their diligence was evidenced by the fact that the plaintiffs filed their § 1983 claims within
one year of reversal of their convictions, which marked the time at
160
which they had reasonably believed that the claims had accrued.
Accordingly, the court found that “this [was] the unusual case that
161
fit[] neatly within the doctrine of equitable tolling.” The court also
concluded that “Michigan law tolled the three-year statute of limitations while the plaintiffs’ convictions were still viable, and filing this
case within three years of the reversal of those convictions d[id] not
162
result in a statute of limitations bar.” Thus, the plaintiffs were not
denied the right to pursue a remedy for the Fourth Amendment violations that they had suffered—violations that the state appellate
163
court already found.
Offering equitable tolling in this context is crucial to the protection of those § 1983 plaintiffs whose claims are likely meritorious,
considering that these are the plaintiffs who have received favorable
outcomes in their criminal trials or on appeal from their convictions.
Reliance on prior interpretations of Heck—especially when precedential in the governing circuit—does not justify stripping a litigant of his
ability to receive a remedy for a constitutional violation, for which he
has already suffered extensively while enduring lengthy and arduous
state-court criminal proceedings. There should be an exception to
barring a potentially meritorious claim where a litigant has been victimized by a change in, or new interpretation of, the governing law,
especially where that litigant, while imprisoned, had little access to
such information.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Equitable tolling, for which Justice Breyer advocated in his Wallace dissent, is the proper procedural safeguard to remedy the inequities that have resulted from the Wallace decision. Wallace poses serious practical problems because it introduces § 1983 litigants to the
strong possibility that they will have to juggle their civil case alongside
the criminal case against them in order to prevent the statute of limi-

159
160
161
162
163

Kucharski, 526 F. Supp. 2d at 775.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 769.
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tations from running out and leaving them without recourse. Such
potential § 1983 litigants should be afforded the opportunity to completely immerse themselves in the underlying criminal proceedings,
where their freedom is at stake, without being compelled to present
an effective civil case at the same time and without fear that the statute of limitations will run out if they do not do so immediately. Tolling of the limitations period from the time that criminal proceedings
are initiated against the plaintiff through acquittal, or in case of a
conviction through the time appeal is pending, would most effectively
protect the meritorious claims of potential § 1983 litigants. Although
some states have rules that would allow for such tolling, the disparity
among the states’ tolling laws warrants the Supreme Court’s intervention and implementation of a federal tolling statute to address this
issue adequately.
Further, notwithstanding the argument that the limitations period should be tolled for the duration of the criminal proceeding and
any subsequent appeal, courts should offer equitable tolling to § 1983
litigants who have reasonably relied to their detriment on prior interpretations of Heck and have untimely filed their civil claims solely
because of this confusion. A criminal defendant should not lose the
opportunity to seek relief for a constitutional violation where his
failure to file within the applicable limitations period was due to no
fault of his own but was instead the product of confusion caused by
the courts.

